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Abstract
■ Interactions between the visual system and the motor sys-
tem during action observation are important for functions such
as imitation and action understanding. Here, we asked whether
such processes might be influenced by the cognitive context in
which actions are performed. We recorded ERPs in a delayed
go/no-go task known to induce bidirectional interference be-
tween the motor system and the visual system (visuomotor
interference). Static images of hand gestures were presented
as go stimuli after participants had planned either a matching
(congruent) or nonmatching (incongruent) action. Participants
performed the identical task in two different cognitive contexts:
In one, they focused on the visual image of the hand gesture
shown as the go stimulus (image context), whereas in the
other, they focused on the hand gesture they performed (action
context). We analyzed the N170 elicited by the go stimulus
to test the influence of action plans on action observation
(motor-to-visual priming). We also analyzed movement-related
activity following the go stimulus to examine the influence of
action observation on action planning (visual-to-motor priming).
Strikingly, the context manipulation reversed the direction of
the priming effects: We found stronger motor-to-visual priming
in the action context compared with the image context and
stronger visual-to-motor priming in the image context compared
with the action context. Taken together, our findings indicate
that neural interactions between motor and visual processes
for executed and observed actions can change depending on
task demands and are sensitive to top–down control according
to the context. ■
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between perception and action is a key
factor in unravelling the current debate over how we
understand othersʼ intentions (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia,
2010), how we are able to imitate (Iacoboni, 1999, 2005;
Buccino et al., 2004), and how we select our actions in
social contexts (Bonini & Ferrari, 2011). Whereas tra-
ditional views considered perception and action as two
independent systems working serially, recent neurophys-
iological and behavioral data have shown that the visual
and motor systems are directly linked and interdepen-
dent (Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). Compelling evidence
for this new conceptualization has been found in studies
of action observation. It is well known that observing
anotherʼs actions influences activity in the observerʼs own
motor system (visual-to-motor priming; Kilner, Paulignan,
& Blakemore, 2003; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti,
1995), so that he or she is faster to initiate movements that
match (or are congruent with) a concurrently observed
action than to initiate movements that are mismatched
(incongruent; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti,
2002). What is less widely appreciated is that motor plans
can also modulate the perceptual processing of observed
actions (Bortoletto,Mattingley, &Cunnington, 2011; Cattaneo
et al., 2010; Press, Gherri, Heyes, & Eimer, 2010) and
influence perceptual judgments (motor-to-visual priming;
Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007).
In primates, networks of parietal and premotor cortical
areas provide a link between visual and motor systems.
The discovery of mirror neurons in these regions, that
is, neurons that respond during both action execution
and action observation, suggests that mirror neurons
provide a potential neurophysiological substrate for the
interaction between action and perception (Gallese, Fadiga,
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). Mirror mechanisms might
therefore support sensory–motor transformations of
actions during action observation and mediate visuomotor
interference effects, as many researchers have proposed
(Gallese, Gernsbacher, Heyes, Hickok, & Iacoboni, 2011;
Heyes, 2011; Longo & Bertenthal, 2009; Schütz-Bosbach
& Prinz, 2007; Kilner et al., 2003; Craighero et al., 2002).
A crucial question is whether the link between percep-
tion and action, that is, visual–motor interaction, can be
regulated by higher cognitive processes. Human studies
on action observation suggest that attention can modu-
late interactions between the visual and motor systems.
Indeed, directing attention to an observed action (Spengler,
Brass, Kühn, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2010; Chong, Cunnington,
Williams, & Mattingley, 2009; Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper,
2007) or to specific action-related features of a stimulus
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(Longo & Bertenthal, 2009; Longo, Kosobud, & Bertenthal,
2008) increases visuomotor interference effects and affects
cortical activity associated with action observation (Schuch,
Bayliss, Klein, & Tipper, 2010; Chong, Cunnington, Williams,
Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008). Moreover, it has been
shown that motor cortex activity during action observation,
as indexedbymu-rhythmsuppression (Muthukumaraswamy,
Johnson, & McNair, 2004; Pineda, Allison, & Vankov, 2000),
can bemodulated by involvement in social interactions (Perry,
Stein, & Bentin, 2011; Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran,
2007). Nevertheless, Cook and coworkers (Cook, Bird,
Lünser, Huck, & Heyes, 2012) have shown that the ten-
dency to imitate othersʼ actions is automatic, in that it
occurs even when imitative behavior is unhelpful (Cook
et al., 2012), suggesting that visuomotor interference (i.e.,
automatic imitation) may not be completely inhibited by
actorsʼ intentions.
Here, we explored top–down regulation of visuomotor
interference by varying the cognitive context in which
participants performed hand gestures that they executed
while viewing congruent or incongruent gesture images.
On the basis of previous work (Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis,
2010; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003; Craighero et al.,
2002), we reasoned that the direction of any visual–
motor interaction, that is, either as visual-to-motor prim-
ing or motor-to-visual priming, should change depending
on contingent cognitive demands. Specifically, when par-
ticipants are required to observe and attend to actions
performed by someone else, visual-to-motor priming
should be most salient and thus observed actions should
exert a robust influence on the preparation and execu-
tion of oneʼs own actions. Conversely, when participants
are required to monitor their own actions, motor-to-
visual priming should become more apparent and thus
intended actions should have a greater influence on the
visual processing of observed actions. Such evidence
would provide a crucial test of accounts that assume that
top–down control in response to task demands dynami-
cally alters bidirectional interactions between visual and
motor systems during action observation.
Here, we distinguished visual-to-motor and motor-to-
visual priming using a novel behavioral task combined
with simultaneous recording of ERPs. Visual ERPs evoked
by action observation, during concurrent action planning,
permit examination of the influence of the motor system
on early visual processing of observed actions (motor-to-
visual priming). Previous studies have shown a negative
ERP component, occurring around 170 msec after the
presentation of images of body parts, that is referred to
either as an N170 (Kovacs et al., 2006) or N1 (Taylor,
Roberts, Downing, & Thierry, 2010) component. This
N170 peak corresponds to the structural encoding of
the stimulus (Kovacs et al., 2006; Eimer, 2000; Bentin,
Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996) and is modulated
by the congruency between performed actions and ob-
served actions (Bortoletto et al., 2011). The N170 there-
fore provides an index of neural processes associated
with visual perception of observed gestures (Peelen &
Downing, 2007). Similarly, movement-related potentials
preceding the motor response to a visual stimulus can
be employed to examine the influence of a visual stimu-
lus on neural processes associated with planning for
action (visual-to-motor priming; Eimer, 1998; Gratton
et al., 1990). Indeed, the neural processes associated with
the preparation and selection for action involve activity
lateralized to the motor cortex contralateral to the side
of movement and are reflected in lateralized readiness
potentials (LRPs; Leuthold, Sommer, & Ulrich, 2004;
Kutas & Donchin, 1980). Here, we examined the N170
and LRP to index visual and motor processes as partici-
pants observed and executed actions concurrently, with
the aim of investigating whether visual–motor inter-
actions during action observation are modulated by cog-
nitive context.
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four right-handed healthy volunteers (12 women,
aged 18–39 years, mean age = 22.5 years) gave their writ-
ten informed consent to participate in the study. The study
was approved by the medical research ethics committee of
The University of Queensland. Data from four participants
were excluded from analyses because of excessive artifacts
in the EEG signal.
Procedure
Participants were comfortably seated in a dimly illumi-
nated room, facing an LCD monitor placed 70 cm in front
of them. Their hands rested in a comfortable position on
a table, with response boxes positioned adjacent to each
hand. Their right arm was placed beneath a cardboard
occluder to prevent them from seeing their own hand
movements.
The experiment consisted of a delayed go/no-go task
(Figure 1). In each trial, participants were required to
prepare one of four possible hand gestures as indicated
by a word cue presented in the center of the display
(“OK,” “peace,” “thumbs-up,” or “point”) and to perform
the gesture as quickly as possible upon presentation of
the go stimulus. The go stimulus consisted of a photo-
graph of one of the four possible hand gestures per-
formed by the same actor, depicted from an allocentric
(third-person) perspective (Figure 2A). All gesture
images were presented centrally at fixation, within ap-
proximately 10° of visual angle. The gesture image either
matched the action being prepared (congruent trials) or
was one of the other nonmatching gestures (incongruent
trials). Because gesture images depicted a right hand
from an allocentric perspective, observed actions and
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performed actions did not share spatial features. To avoid
a disparity in the frequency of presentation of particular
actions as “congruent” or “incongruent,” each gesture
was paired with one of the other gestures (counter-
balanced between participants), and for incongruent trials,
only the paired incongruent gesture was used. Participants
responded to the go stimulus with their right hand by
releasing a button and performing the prepared action as
quickly as possible. Performed actions were monitored by
the experimenter via an infrared camera mounted inside
the occluding box around the participantʼs hand. In one
third of the trials, a no-go stimulus was presented, rep-
resented by a “stop” hand gesture, and participants were
required to withhold their response.
To manipulate the cognitive context, participants were
instructed at the start of a block of trials that they would
be required to perform an “action recall task” and report
either the hand action they had performed (action con-
text) or the hand action they had seen (image context).
Following the go/no-go stimulus (a variable delay of
Figure 1. Time course of a
typical trial of the go/no-go
task in Experiment 1. In each
trial, an initial word cue
indicated one of four possible
hand gestures (“OK,” “peace,”
“thumbs-up,” “point”).
Participants prepared and
performed the cued gesture
with their right hand as
quickly as possible in
response to go cues (2/3 of
trials) and withheld responses
to no-go cues (1/3 of trials).
Go cues consisted of a static
image of a hand gesture that
either matched (congruent) or
did not match (incongruent)
the cued and executed action.
RTs, visual evoked potentials,
and movement-related activity
(L-LRP) were measured.
After performing the action,
participants were required
to report either the action
they had performed (action
context) or the action they
had seen (image context)
and to select the correct
response among the four
possible gestures.
Figure 2. Images of the
four hand gestures employed
as the go stimuli in the task,
in both allocentric perspective
(A) and egocentric perspective
(B). In Experiment 1, only
images in the allocentric
perspective were presented.
In Experiment 2, both images
in the allocentric and
egocentric perspectives
were presented.
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700–1300 msec), a horizontal array of all four hand ges-
ture images was presented, and participants were re-
quired to select the appropriate gesture by pressing the
corresponding key with their left hand. The cognitive
context changed between blocks.
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants un-
dertook a short training session to familiarize themselves
with the actions employed in the task. Initially, partici-
pants simply watched and imitated the four gestures
eight times each to learn the gestures and their asso-
ciated word-cue labels. Next, participants performed
two practice blocks of 24 trials of the go/no-go task,
one for each context. In these blocks, the selection of
the action to be remembered was followed by feedback
(correct/incorrect) on responses. For the full experiment,
participants performed the go/no-go task in 10 blocks of
52 trials, alternating for each cognitive context, with the
order counterbalanced between participants. The first
four trials of each block were discarded from analyses to
avoid possible task-switching effects. (These excluded trials
were also balanced across all possible task conditions so as
not to affect the counterbalancing of the analyzed trials.)
Four hundred eighty trials were analyzed, consisting of
80 trials for each condition (congruent, incongruent, and
no-go) in each context (image vs. action).
Recording and Analyses
A 64-channel EEG and vertical and horizontal EOGs were
recorded continuously using a BioSemi Active Two EEG
system, at a sampling rate of 512 Hz. EEG data were re-
referenced off-line to an average reference.
We analyzed visual ERPs time-locked to the presenta-
tion of the gesture image, focusing specifically on the
N170 component, and premovement potentials time-
locked to the onset of movement (as indexed by button
release), during the delay following the go signal. For the
N170 analyses, the EEG signal was band-pass filtered at 1–
45 Hz, segmented into epochs from 100 msec before to
500 msec after the go stimulus onset, and baseline cor-
rected relative to the first 100 msec of the epoch. For
the premovement ERPs, the signal was band-pass filtered
at 0.1–30 Hz, segmented into epochs from 800 msec be-
fore to 500 msec after the movement onset, and baseline
corrected relative to the first 300 msec of the epoch. If
the EEG signal exceeded ±120 μV or if eye blink, eye
movement, or other artifacts were present, epochs were
rejected from the analyses. Average ERPs were calculated
separately for congruent and incongruent trials in the
action context and the image context.
We measured the N170 amplitude in each individual as
the maximum negative peak recorded between 130 and
200 msec at the electrode showing maximal amplitude
(PO7) and on the corresponding electrode in the oppo-
site hemisphere (PO8). For premovement ERPs, we
analyzed lateralized activity over the left motor cortex
preceding movement onset, which we will refer to as
the left LRP (L-LRP). This activity was calculated in the
same way as conventional LRPs (Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag,
Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988) by subtracting activity over
the motor cortex ipsilateral to the side of movement
from activity of the motor cortex in the contralateral
hemisphere. Because all movements were performed
with the right hand, we calculated the difference wave-
form between electrodes C3 and C4. The mean ampli-
tude calculated over the last 300 msec before
movement onset was used to quantify the L-LRP.
Statistical Analyses
Separate repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on
the N170 amplitude, L-LRP amplitude, and RTs. For the
N170, ANOVA included factors of Context (action context,
image context), congruency of gesture images (congru-
ent, incongruent), and electrode (PO7, PO8). For L-LRP
and RTs, the ANOVAs included factors of Context (action
context, image context) and Congruency of gesture
images (congruent, incongruent). In all analyses, signifi-
cant interactions were followed up with paired t tests as
post hoc tests. We also conducted correlation analyses
between the behavioral index of the priming effect and
the neurophysiological index. For each participant, we
calculated the RT difference between incongruent and
congruent trials and correlated this separately with the
N170 amplitude difference and the LRP amplitude differ-
ence for incongruent versus congruent trials.
Errors in participantsʼ performance were assessed by
measuring anticipations (i.e., responses initiated before
the go cue), misses, or wrongly performed actions for
the go cue, false alarms for the no-go cue, and incorrect
actions reported.
Results and Discussion
Mean amplitudes of the N170 (Figure 3A), which reflect
the visual processing of observed action images, revealed
that motor-to-visual priming was modulated by cognitive
context. The N170 was significantly larger for congruent
than incongruent gestures [main effect of Congruency, F(1,
19) = 5.08, p < .05] and also larger in the image context
than in the action context [main effect of Congruency, F(1,
19) = 7.90, p< .05]. Crucially, there was a significant inter-
action between the congruency effect and the cognitive
context [Context × Congruency interaction, F(1, 19) =
4.42, p < .05]. In the action context, paired t tests showed
that the N170 was significantly larger for congruent ges-
tures compared with incongruent gestures ( p < .05); by
contrast, in the image context, there was no significant dif-
ference in the N170 amplitude between congruent and in-
congruent gestures ( p > .05). Moreover, the N170 for
incongruent gestures was significantly smaller in the action
context than in the image context ( p < .005). To summa-
rize, therefore, the influence of motor plans on visual pro-
cessing of observed actions, that is, the congruency effect
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Figure 3. Visual evoked potentials (N170) and movement-related activity (L-LRP) in Experiment 1. (A, top) Visual evoked potentials were time-
locked to the presentation of the go cue (i.e., the image of the hand gesture), and N170 amplitudes were examined. (A, center) Visual evoked
potentials over PO7 and PO8, shown for congruent and incongruent trials, both in the action context and in the image context. The topography is
shown at the peak of the N170, at 157 msec following presentation of the hand gesture image. (A, bottom) Mean and standard error of N170
amplitudes elicited by gesture images that were congruent or incongruent with planned actions, measured in the action context and in the
image context. *p < .05. (B, top) Movement-related potentials were time-locked to the onset of the motor response. By subtracting signals over
ipsilateral (right) from contralateral (left) motor areas (i.e., electrodes C3 and C4), we obtained the L-LRP, representing lateralized activity over the
left motor cortex preceding movement onset for the right hand. (B, center) The L-LRP is shown for congruent and incongruent trials, both in the
action context and in the image context. To derive a topographical visualization of the LRP, the same right-minus-left calculation was applied to
all equivalent lateral electrode pairs, and the average signals in the last 300 msec before movement onset were projected onto the left hemisphere.
(B, bottom) Mean and standard error of L-LRP amplitudes for congruent and incongruent trials, both in the action context and in the image context.
*p < .05.
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on the N170, was significant only in the action context,
when participants were required to focus on their intended
actions. By contrast, when participants focused on the ges-
ture images themselves, there was no effect of congruency
on the N170 component.
The N170 was also more prominent over the left hemi-
sphere than over the right hemisphere [main effect of
electrode, F(1, 19) = 11.42, p < .005]. Previous studies
have suggested that the N170 is lateralized to the left
hemisphere for the visual processing of hand images
(Wheaton, Pipingas, Silberstein, & Puce, 2001; McCarthy,
Puce, Belger, & Allison, 1999). Also, in a previous study,
we found that the N170 was significantly larger over the
hemisphere contralateral to a planned action, suggesting
an enhanced responsiveness of the neural generators of
the N170 to planned actions in the hemisphere involved
in preparing the action (Bortoletto et al., 2011). The later-
ality of the N170 did not interact with any other factor.
Results for the L-LRP (Figure 3B), which reflects motor
processes for action preparation, revealed that the cogni-
tive context influenced visual-to-motor priming in a com-
plementary way to that observed for the N170. The L-LRP
was significantly larger for congruent than incongruent ges-
tures [main effect of Congruency, F(1, 19) = 9.84, p < .01],
and this congruency effect was again modulated by the
cognitive context [Context × Congruency interaction,
F(1, 19) = 5.00, p < .05]. Paired t tests revealed that, in
the image context, the L-LRP was significantly larger for
congruent trials than for incongruent trials ( p < .005);
by contrast, in the action context, the L-LRP was not sig-
nificantly different between congruent and incongruent
trials ( p > .05). Because the L-LRP measure was baseline-
corrected to a time interval that overlapped the presenta-
tion of the gesture image, we performed a second analysis
inwhich the baselinewas set between−800 and−600msec
(corresponding, on average, to the 200 msec preceding
the presentation of the gesture image). This additional
analysis yielded the same statistical results, confirming that
differences in L-LRP amplitudes were not simply caused by
differences in gesture image processing occurring during
the L-LRP baseline interval. To summarize, the influence
of observed actions on neural processes associated with
motor planning (the congruency effect on the L-LRP)
was significant only in the image context, when partici-
pants focused on the observed actions. By contrast, when
participants focused on their performed actions, there
was no effect of congruency on the L-LRP.
Correlation analyses performed across cognitive con-
texts showed no significant association between effects
of congruency on RTs and congruency effects on either
the N170 or L-LRP amplitudes (highest r = .27, p = .24).
Taken together, the analyses of the N170 and L-LRP re-
vealed stronger motor-to-visual priming in the action con-
text and stronger visual-to-motor priming in the image
context, consistent with the hypothesis that visual–motor
interactions are sensitive to context during action obser-
vation (Teufel et al., 2010).
Mean RTs to the go signal replicated previous findings
of visuomotor interference (for a review, see Heyes,
2011; Figure 4). RTs were significantly shorter when the
depicted action and the executed action were congruent
than when they were incongruent [main effect of Con-
gruency, F(1, 19) = 19.36, p < .005]. Interestingly, there
was also a significant interaction between congruency
and cognitive context [Context × Congruency inter-
action, F(1, 19) = 7.24, p < .05]. Paired t tests showed
that, for incongruent trials, RTs were significantly longer
in the image context than in the action context ( p< .05),
whereas there was no significant difference between con-
texts for congruent trials ( p > .05). In summary, incon-
gruency between an observed action and a performed
action significantly slowed the time required to initiate
a response, and this effect was larger in the image con-
text than in the action context.
Participants made very few errors across conditions
and contexts. The mean percentage of errors for report-
ing gestures was 2.31% in the image context (reporting
the action seen) and 1.81% in the action context (report-
ing the action performed). This difference was not sig-
nificant (paired t test: t(19) = .94, p = .36). Likewise,
the percentage of errors for the go stimulus was low,
with less than 5% anticipations, misses, and wrongly per-
formed actions combined and only 11% false alarms to
the no-go stimulus.
Overall, Experiment 1 showed that visual processing
and motor preparation in a visuomotor interference para-
digm are modulated depending on the cognitive context,
suggesting that top–down control can influence the
mechanisms of interaction between the motor system
and the visual system. In general, the congruency be-
tween observed and executed actions did not affect neural
processes for that aspect of the task that was most relevant
and specifically attended; it was only the nonrelevant
aspect of the task that was affected by congruency. For
example, when participants focused on observed actions,
the visual processing of those actions (N170) was not
affected by the congruency of planned actions, whereas
Figure 4. Mean and standard error of RTs in Experiment 1, for
congruent and incongruent trials, both in the action context and
in the image context. The congruency effect is significantly reduced
in the action context compared with the image context. *p < .05.
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motor preparatory activity (L-LRP) was significantly in-
creased for congruent actions. Conversely, when par-
ticipants focused on their performed actions, motor
preparatory activity (L-LRP) was not affected by the con-
gruency of observed actions, whereas N170 amplitudes
during early visual processing were significantly smaller
for incongruent than congruent actions.
It is not possible at this stage to individuate the level at
which interactions between the motor and visual systems
(as defined in Heyes, 2011) are modulated by cognitive
context: whether the input level, that is, the processing
of the visual stimulus, or visual–motor associations, or
the output level, that is, the motor program. Rather,
our data suggest that the direction of the visual–motor
interaction, that is, either as visual-to-motor priming or
motor-to-visual priming, can change according to contin-
gent demands.
The direction of the congruency effect we observed for
the N170 is at odds with the previous findings. In the cur-
rent study, the N170 was larger for congruent gestures
than for incongruent gestures in the action context,
whereas previous studies (Bortoletto et al., 2011; Press
et al., 2010) reported that the N170 was smaller for con-
gruent gestures than for incongruent gestures. Although
this “inversion of the congruency effect” has been shown
according to spatial compatibility between observed and
executed actions (Press et al., 2010), it is unlikely that
spatial congruency, that is, the matching of spatial fea-
tures between the performed actions and the observed
actions, can explain our results. Indeed, we controlled
for spatial compatibility effects by carefully constructing
the images so that they did not have more critical fea-
tures on the left than the right side and so that they
had roughly equal pixels left and right. Moreover, the
same stimuli were used in our previous study (Bortoletto
et al., 2011) in which the N170 was larger for incongruent
gestures compared with congruent gestures. Therefore,
the inversion of the effect cannot be because of specific
spatial features of the stimuli.
Alternatively, this inversion of the congruency effect
might depend on the observerʼs point of view, that is,
an egocentric perspective (the observer sees the action
as if it was performed by himself/herself ) versus an allo-
centric perspective (as if the observer faces someone else
performing the action). Only Press et al. (2010) have pre-
viously investigated the visual processing of observed
actions when action images are presented as the go
stimulus, as in our Experiment 1, and they included
images in an egocentric perspective. Interestingly, our
Experiment 1 suggests that, when observed actions, as
the go cue, are seen from an allocentric perspective,
the congruency effect is reversed relative to when actions
are observed from an egocentric perspective (Press et al.,
2010). In a purely behavioral study, we recently reported
that the effect of cognitive context on visuomotor inter-
ference is indeed perspective-dependent, that is, visuo-
motor interference in the action context is stronger for
gesture images from an egocentric perspective than for
those from an allocentric perspective (Bortoletto,
Mattingley, & Cunnington, 2013). Hand images in the
egocentric perspective better match the representation
of the action outcome that is created at the time of move-
ment initiation (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Hommel,
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) and may there-
fore trigger different matching processes between pre-
dicted and observed action outcomes (Bortoletto et al.,
2013). To verify this effect of perspective and to provide
further support for the conclusions drawn from Experi-
ment 1, we replicated the initial experiment in an inde-
pendent sample. Specifically, in Experiment 2, we
repeated the action context of Experiment 1 in which
congruency effects on the N170 were found. This time,
however, we varied the perspective of the observed
actions to directly compare congruency effects on the
N170 for gesture images presented from egocentric
compared with allocentric perspectives.
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
Participants
Experiment 2 involved 18 right-handed healthy volunteers
(10 women, aged 19–28 years, mean age = 22.3 years).
None of them had taken part in Experiment 1. Participants
gave their written informed consent to participate, and
the study was approved by the medical research ethics
committee of The University of Queensland.
Procedure
The setup and stimuli from Experiment 1 were used
again for Experiment 2. After a brief training session,
participants performed the same delayed go/no-go task
in the action context as in Experiment 1 but with the pre-
sented hand gesture images differing in terms of the per-
spective from which the gesture images were depicted:
egocentric (first person) perspective and allocentric
(third person) perspective (Figure 2). Participants were
required to prepare a hand gesture as indicated by an
initial word cue and to perform the gesture as quickly
as possible upon presentation of the go stimulus. Partici-
pants responded to the go stimulus with their right hand
by releasing a button and performing the prepared action
as quickly as possible. In one third of the trials, a no-go
stimulus was presented, represented by a “stop” hand
gesture, and participants were required to withhold their
response. As Experiment 2 was conducted entirely in the
action context, following the response to the go/no-go
stimulus, participants were required to report the hand
action they had performed by selecting one of the four
gesture images presented on the screen.
Gesture images in the egocentric and allocentric per-
spectives were presented in random order in all blocks.
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Participants completed 13 blocks of 40 trials each. The
first block was used as practice and excluded from
analyses. As in Experiment 1, 480 trials were analyzed,
consisting of 80 trials for each condition (congruent, in-
congruent, and no-go) in each perspective condition
(egocentric, allocentric).
ERPs and Statistical Analyses
EEG recording and data preprocessing of ERPs, time-
locked to the presentation of the gesture image, were
performed exactly as in Experiment 1. For the data anal-
ysis, the N170 was measured as the peak amplitude in
the time window between 130 and 210 msec following
presentation of the gesture image at the electrode show-
ing maximal amplitude (P7) and the corresponding elec-
trode in the opposite hemisphere (P8). Statistical
analyses on the N170 were conducted using a three-way
repeated-measures ANOVA including factors of Per-
spective (egocentric, allocentric), Congruency of gesture
images (congruent, incongruent), and Hemisphere
(P7 left, P8 right). Interactions involving Congruency
were followed up with paired t tests to compare ERPs
to congruent and incongruent hand gesture images.
RTs to the go stimulus were recorded and analyzed
using a two-way repeated Measures ANOVA that included
factors of Perspective (egocentric, allocentric) and Con-
gruency of gesture images (congruent, incongruent). Par-
ticipantsʼ compliance with task instructions was assessed
by measuring anticipations (i.e., responses initiated
before the go cue), misses, or wrongly performed actions
for the go cue; false alarms for the no-go cue; and in-
correct actions reported.
Results and Discussion
As can be seen in Figure 5, the N170 amplitude was
modulated by the congruency between observed action
and performed action for stimulus images presented
both in egocentric and allocentric perspectives. Overall,
the N170 was significantly larger over the left hemisphere
than over the right hemisphere [main effect of Hemi-
sphere, F(1, 17) = 19.23, p < .05]. Crucially, ANOVA
revealed a three-way interaction between Hemisphere,
Congruency, and Perspective [F(1, 17) = 10.86, p <
.05]. In the left hemisphere, post hoc tests showed that
the N170 was significantly larger for congruent trials than
incongruent trials in the allocentric perspective [t(17) =
2.14, p < .05). By contrast, in the egocentric condition,
the N170 showed an opposite tendency, being slightly
larger for incongruent than congruent trials, although
this difference was not statistically significant [t(17) =
1.40, p = .18]. No congruency effects were found over
the right hemisphere.
These results replicate our results from Experiment 1,
showing that visual processing of observed actions is
modulated when a concurrent motor plan is task relevant
(action context). Specifically, the N170 was larger for
congruent trials compared with incongruent trials in
the allocentric perspective condition. Moreover, the per-
spective of the observed action seems to determine the
direction of the congruency effect on the N170. In the
Figure 5. Visual evoked
potentials (N170) in
Experiment 2, shown in
the left hemisphere (P7) for
congruent and incongruent
trials, both in the egocentric
(left) and allocentric (right)
conditions. (Top) Mean
visual evoked potential
waveforms. (Bottom) Mean
and standard error of N170
peak amplitudes across
participants. *p < .05.
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egocentric perspective, although the difference between
congruent and incongruent trials was not statistically
significant, the direction was reversed and consistent
with that reported previously by Press et al. (2010) for
gesture images in an egocentric perspective.
RTs to initiate the hand actions were significantly faster
in congruent trials than in incongruent trials [main effect
of congruency: F(1, 17) = 13.10, p < .005]. Crucially, the
congruency effect was modulated by the perspective of
observed actions [Perspective × Congruency interaction:
F(1, 17) = 4.58, p < .05]. This interaction arose from a
much larger congruency effect for images presented in
the egocentric perspective (congruent: 646 ± 159 msec,
incongruent: 726 ± 197 msec) compared with images
presented in the allocentric perspective (congruent:
661 ± 172 msec, incongruent: 701 ± 184 msec). These
results replicate those reported in a recent study in which
we examined the effects of perspective and context on
visuomotor interference (Bortoletto et al., 2013) and
are consistent with previous studies showing that action
images presented from an egocentric perspective trigger
stronger visuomotor interference than images from an
allocentric perspective (Bruzzo, Borghi, & Ghirlanda,
2008; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006).
Error rates on the task were low and did not differ
significantly between conditions, suggesting that partici-
pants performed the task well and according to instruc-
tions. The percentage of error trials on the go stimulus
for egocentric and allocentric conditions, respectively, were
0.10% and 0.20% for anticipations [t(17) = 4.20, p > .05]
and 2.50% and 2.95% for misses [t(17) = 4.20, p > .05].
False alarms to the no-go stimulus were 5.07%. The mean
percentage errors for reporting gestures performed was
4.65% in the egocentric condition and 4.31% in the allo-
centric condition [t(17) = 0.53, p > .05].
We suggest that observing actions from an egocentric
or allocentric perspective may lead to different identifica-
tion of the actionsʼ agent, that is, the participants them-
selves or others, respectively (Bortoletto et al., 2013;
David et al., 2006; Vogt et al., 2003). If an incongruent
action is observed from an egocentric perspective, visual
processing of the action may trigger detection of a mis-
match between intended actions and current external
cues, which could be important for action updating at
the time of movement initiation (Bortoletto et al., 2013;
Press et al., 2010). By contrast, images seen from an allo-
centric perspective, which would be viewed as actions
performed by another, may be less relevant for action
control at the time of movement initiation and thus may
not trigger the same “mismatch mechanisms.” The visual
processing of congruent actions from an allocentric per-
spective may therefore be facilitated because such actions
represent the same action goal but do not conflict directly
with the intended action because of the different perspec-
tive and agency implied.
Moreover, this mechanism may also depend on the tim-
ing of the presentation of the gesture image. In the early
stages of motor planning, the representation of an actionʼs
consequences may be sufficiently abstract to ignore the
perspective from which the action is observed, and incon-
gruent observed actions both from egocentric and allo-
centric perspectives may trigger “mismatch” mechanisms.
This would fit with our previous study (Bortoletto et al.,
2011) in which observed actions were presented early dur-
ing motor planning rather than at the time of movement
initiation. Further studies on these complex mechanisms
are warranted.
To summarize, Experiment 2 replicated and extended
our findings in Experiment 1. Taken together, the results
of the two experiments suggest that, when performed
actions are most relevant, the motor plan for intended
actions modulates the visual processing of concurrently
observed actions. In addition, the direction of this effect,
that is, whether the N170 is increased for congruent or
incongruent observed actions, is influenced by the viewerʼs
perspective when images are presented at the time of
movement initiation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, our findings suggest that visual–motor inter-
action during observation of action can change depending
on cognitive context, suggesting that interactions between
the motor system and the visual system are influenced by
top–down (intentional) control. When performed actions
were task relevant, the motor system had a stronger influ-
ence on the visual system (motor-to-visual priming). Con-
versely, when observed actions were task relevant, the
visual system had a stronger influence on the motor
system (visual-to-motor priming).
It should be noted that both the action and image con-
texts produced similar effects on RTs to initiate move-
ments. Indeed, in both context conditions, participants
were significantly faster to initiate movements that were
congruent with the observed action than to initiate move-
ments that were incongruent, although this effect was
stronger in the image context. This is not surprising given
that RTs presumably reflect a combination of perception,
selection, and motor planning processes before the ini-
tiation of responses and therefore may not be sensitive
to the effects of context on different stages of processing.
Crucially, by using ERPs, we were able to show that visual–
motor interactions during action observation were the
result of two different underlying processes operating in
different contexts. In future work, it would be interesting to
examine how a behavioral measure based purely on per-
ceptual discrimination, as opposed to RT, is influenced by
context and congruency of concurrently planned actions.
In the action context, the N170 amplitude was signifi-
cantly modulated by the congruency between the ob-
served action and the performed action, suggesting that
the participantʼs planned or intended action interfered
with the visual processing of the incongruent observed
gesture. Previous studies have shown that the amplitude
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of the N170 to observed actions is modulated when
participants concurrently prepare or execute an action
(Bortoletto et al., 2011; Press et al., 2010). Moreover,
we have shown that more general semantic aspects of
action representation, and holding the action represen-
tation in working memory, do not induce effects on the
N170; instead, this modulation is specific to action plan-
ning (Bortoletto et al., 2011). Importantly, in these pre-
vious studies, the content or meaning of the observed
action was irrelevant to the participantʼs task, equivalent
to the action context in the current study. Here, we have
shown that, when participants must encode the observed
action for later report, there is no influence of the con-
currently planned action on visual processing (N170). It is
only in the action context, when the observed action is
task irrelevant, that the N170 is influenced by concurrent
motor plans.
In the image context, motor preparatory activity (L-
LRP) was significantly larger in amplitude for congruent
than incongruent gestures, suggesting that observed ac-
tions caused a modulation of motor activity for the prep-
aration of congruent motor responses. Such an increase
in motor activity suggests that action observation may
have activated motor representations of the same action,
thereby facilitating movement-related activity in the
motor system in the contralateral hemisphere. It should
be noted, however, that the L-LRP reflects lateralized
activity associated with action selection and preparation
but differs from more typical LRPs because it was calcu-
lated with a single subtraction method in the left hemi-
sphere only. Such an approach permits examination of
lateralized activity, but it does not necessarily eliminate
potential confounds related to hemispheric differences
(Oostenveld, Stegeman, Praamstra, & Van Oosterom,
2003). Nevertheless, differences in amplitude of the
L-LRP across conditions and contexts in this study clearly
provide an index of the modulation of motor-related activ-
ity before movement initiation.
The lack of effects on the N170 in the image context
may at first seem surprising considering that the ob-
served action was held in working memory until a re-
sponse was required, that is, during the execution of
the movement. However, it is unlikely that the mainte-
nance of the gesture image in working memory alone
would directly induce an effect on the N170. Indeed, a
previous study on working memory for human body
forms showed that processes associated with the early
encoding of the stimulus (i.e., the N170) are not modu-
lated by the working memory load in the encoding phase
(Bauser, Mayer, Daum, & Suchan, 2011), corresponding
to the time of presentation of the gesture image in our
study. Moreover, several studies have reported the P300
to be the earliest ERP component modulated by working
memory in the encoding phase (Kok, 2001; Fabiani,
Karis, & Donchin, 1986).
Similarly, it is unlikely that our findings are explained
by the semantic representation of actions alone or that
the sensory–motor interference we observed arose from
a more abstract or semantic-level representation of the
gestures evoked by the initial word cue rather than the
specific planning of action. In a previous study, in which
we used the same meaningful, symbolic gestures in a
similar paradigm, we found no effects of semantics on
sensory–motor interference (Bortoletto et al., 2011). In
that study, we included a control condition in which par-
ticipants were required to remember and maintain the
cued gesture in working memory for later recall, rather
than preparing the gesture for execution. Effects of image
congruency on N170 were found only when participants
concurrently planned actions and not when maintaining
gestures in working memory for later recall. This previous
finding, that congruency effects are only seen during the
planning and execution of actions (Bortoletto et al.,
2011), indicates that sensory–motor interference repre-
sents influences of the motor system on visual processing
(and vice versa) rather than any other effects of semantic
or lexical representation in working memory. Therefore,
the modulation of congruency effects by cognitive con-
text that we report here most likely represent a top–down
consequence of visual–motor interactions, rather than
any direct effects of prefrontal or executive processes
on visual and motor systems separately.
Overall, our results are consistent with the suggestion
that visual–motor interactions are flexible and may adapt
to meet contingent demands. Previous studies have
shown that the strength of visuomotor interference, as
indexed by congruency effects in RTs, can be modulated
by higher cognitive functions such as attention and social
interaction (Perry et al., 2011; Chong et al., 2009; Bach
et al., 2007; Oberman et al., 2007). Attention has also
been shown to modulate neural activity in areas involved
in action observation and associated with visual–motor
interactions. For example, activity in the inferior frontal
gyrus is decreased when attention is diverted from action
observation (Chong et al., 2008). Similarly, activity in the
motor cortex during action observation depends on
attention to those actions (Schuch et al., 2010). More-
over, participantsʼ intentions, for example, to understand
an action or to identify physical features, are associated
with specific patterns of cortical activation during
action observation (Molenberghs, Hayward, Mattingley,
& Cunnington, 2011). This study extends these findings
by showing that top–down regulation changes not only
the strength of interactions between the visual system
and the motor system but also their direction.
Visual and motor systems are linked via parietal and
premotor brain networks. Regions of the posterior infe-
rior frontal gyrus and the rostral inferior parietal lobe are
activated both for action observation and for action execu-
tion and, together with the STS , have been included in an
“action observation network” (Molenberghs, Cunnington,
& Mattingley, 2012; Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff,
2010; Grèzes & Decety, 2001). Changes in the direction
of visual–motor interference revealed in our study
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indicate that cortico–cortical interactions within this net-
work are state dependent. Therefore, the way in which ac-
tions are represented and themanner in which information
is exchanged between visual and motor areas evidently
change depending on the current task or goal of the actor/
observer and his or her cognitive contingencies. This is
consistent with studies that have shown state-dependent
changes in network connectivity (for a review, see Silvanto,
Muggleton, & Walsh, 2008). Such results have been found
both in the motor system during voluntary action produc-
tion and observation (Koch et al., 2010; Koch & Rothwell,
2009; Bestmann et al., 2008) and in the visual system
(Marreiros, Kiebel, & Friston, 2008; Ruff et al., 2008). More-
over, there is evidence that connectivity between the
action observation network and the pFC during action
observation depends on task instructions and whether
participants are making inferences about or merely view-
ing othersʼ actions passively (Schippers & Keysers, 2011).
In future studies, it will be important to determine which
neural regions exert top–down control andmodulate these
interactions between visual and motor systems. The pFC
is a central structure for executive behavioral control.
Neurons of the lateral pFC are involved in multiple exec-
utive functions and, crucially, appear to be related to the
attentional selection of task relevant information and
actions (Tanji & Hoshi, 2008). Moreover, activity in this
area can represent contingent rules and bias activity in
connected areas in line with task requirements (Miller,
2000). Interestingly, recent anatomical studies in monkeys
have revealed connections between regions of the lateral
pFC, that is, the medial part of BA 12r and BA 46v, and a
fronto-parietal network underlying the control of goal-
directed actions and action observation (Borra, Gerbella,
Rozzi, & Luppino, 2011; Nelissen et al., 2011; Barbas,
1988). These studies therefore suggest possible involve-
ment of lateral prefrontal regions in modulating visual–
motor interactions according to task requirements or
contexts. Nevertheless, other mechanisms may be in-
volved. A possible alternative is that the “action observation
network” exerts top–down influence on early visual areas
andmotor areas and that these connections are modulated
by cognitive context. In this case, the modulation of visual–
motor interaction by cognitive context would not require
the involvement of prefrontal structures but would rather
take place through changes within the visuomotor system.
Although our results clearly suggest a link between
motor and visual systems during perception of action,
we can only speculate on the neural mechanisms that
provide this link. It has been suggested that the mirror
neuron system in humans might provide a mechanism
for sensory–motor transformation of actions that can be
employed, in conjunction with higher-order cognitive
systems, to facilitate action understanding (Rizzolatti &
Sinigaglia, 2010), imitation (Iacoboni, 1999, 2005; Buccino
et al., 2004), and the selection of motor responses during
social interactions (Bonini & Ferrari, 2011). The mirror
neuron system has also been proposed to mediate visual–
motor interaction effects during actionobservation (Gallese
et al., 2011; Heyes, 2011; Longo& Bertenthal, 2009; Schütz-
Bosbach & Prinz, 2007; Kilner et al., 2003; Craighero et al.,
2002). Although our results do not speak towhether visual–
motor interaction effects arise from mirror mechanisms or
from some other form of interaction, they may contribute
to the debate on the function of mirror neurons. Indeed,
motor-to-visual priming and visual-to-motor priming may
reflect different functions. Enhanced visual-to-motor prim-
ing during action observation may be important when ob-
serving actions for imitation. Moreover, our finding that
motor-related activity is particularly increased when partici-
pants are actively engaged in observing an action is consis-
tent with involvement of the mirror neuron system in
mapping observed actions to the motor system for action
understanding (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). By contrast,
greater motor-to-visual priming during action performance
may be useful when monitoring the outcome of our own
intended actions. In line with the ideomotor theory of
action (Greenwald, 1970; James, 1890) and with the com-
mon event-coding theory (Prinz, 2005; Hommel et al.,
2001), according to which actions are also represented by
their expected perceptual effects, motor-to-visual priming
may be important for motor learning and for anticipation
of the expected sensory outcomes from intended actions.
In summary, we suggest that visual–motor interactions
during action observation are influenced top–down by
higher cognitive processes, and therefore depend on
current goals or task requirements. Such modulation
allows the motor system to influence the visual process-
ing of observed actions when the execution of movement
is most relevant and allows the visual processing of
observed actions to influence the motor system when
perception of action is most relevant.
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